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Abstract: Our empirical results provide an evidence, department merge of firms will increase 
the profit through the reduction of labor cost, and support why workers in horizontal mergers 
may share in any increases in the production surplus rather than those on vertical mergers (Horn 
and Wolinsky; 1988). On the other hand, the expansion of department in the firm will lead to a 
negative scale effect. The production cost will increase due to the higher labor cost. However, it 
only has significant effect on M&A within the same industry. It implies that horizontal mergers 
will have more chance to expansion of department in the firm because the market share of 
products will increase.  .  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The trend in global financial markets is integrating banking market, capital markets and real 
estate market into a complex integrated market. Compared with major countries in the world, the 
financial industry in Taiwan has some problem, including both smaller scale of operation and 
low return on capital. In order to help poor management of local financial institutions and 
improve operational efficiency, the government of Taiwan ROC decided to promote the merger 
of financial institutions to improve competitiveness. In November 2000 the Government of 
Taiwan ROC adopted "Financial Institutions Merger Law," encouraging financial institutions the 
merger between the industry of legal mechanisms, and the exclusion of tax-related barriers to 
making financial institutions have sufficient incentive to merge. In addition, the Government 
provides financial cross-sector legal mechanism to accelerate the integration of financial 
institutions, in June 2001 through the "Financial Holding Company Law", open 15 financial 
holding company set up to allow various types of financial institutions in the financial holding 
company framework, to capital, access, products, information integration, to provide customers 
one-stop financial services, and maximize operating performance.  
 
Financial integration causes the firms of financial industry providing more  service to fulfill the 
demand of customers. The employee’s wages of financial industry will also be increased. 
Because the labor market has played a lot of buyers changes, but the labor of the seller does not 
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have significant changes. Here, the country rarely have the financial practitioners salary research, 
this article investigates the degree of financial institution integration of different financial 
institutions to do so the salary of employees.  
 
2. Previous Studies 
 
With regard to merger and acquisition (M&A), some scholars argue when the wages are set in 
competitive environment, the merges will decline wages of targets. Shleifer and Summers (1988) 
have argued that acquirers are largely motivated by the opportunity they offer to renege on 
implicit labor contracts and to reduce or eliminate extra-marginal wage payment. Lichtenberg 
and Kim (1989) indicate that horizontal mergers severely depress the wages of airline workers. 
 
However, other scholars claim that the M&A may increase the wage rates, because ownership 
change may have some consequences for the firms that impact on the wage outcome for both 
horizontal and vertical merge. With regard to horizontal merge, Horn and Wolinsky (1988) 
indicate that workers may share in any increases in the production surplus, and the bargaining 
position of the two parties is altered. Horizontal mergers may alter the structure of the product 
market and increase the amount of surplus available for wages. At the same time, vertical 
mergers may eliminate intermediate mark-ups and/or reduce transaction costs, similarly raising 
the surplus. Therefore, the wages of target firms will increase. However, whose firms are 
involved in horizontal mergers will obtain larger wages increases than the firms of vertical 
mergers (Conyon et al. 2004, 2002).  
 
Some scholars believe that the M&A may not have significant effect on wage, especially in 
foreign acquisitions. Bandick (2004) claims that the foreign acquisitions seems to have no effects 
on wages in targeted Swedish MNEs and domestic firms. The foreign acquisitions appear to have 
positive or neutral effects on the targeted firms’ wages and productivity growth. Girma and Görg 
(2007) indicate that the positive post-acquisition wage effects on skilled and unskilled labor 
following acquisitions by US firms, but not such impact from acquisitions by EU firms. However, 
the foreign acquisitions do not popular in Taiwan. In this study, we may consider the effect of 
foreign acquisitions. 
 
Based above analysis, there are some articles tries to investigate that the different effect of M&A 
between the same industry (horizontal mergers) and different industry (vertical mergers). It 
provides the evidences how M&A between horizontal and vertical mergers (HM and VM) affect 
wages. Based on the scale effect, this study will do a further analysis to the effect of elimination 
and expansion of department through HM or VM. The hypothesis will try to estimate whether 
the change of size of department will affect the wages after the M&A within the same industry or 
different industry.  
 
3. Data  
 
Our research investigates the financial industry in Taiwan. This study adopts the method of 
quantitative study, sending the questionnaires to the staff of personal in 100 large financial 
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institutions from "Taiwan Business Name Record Database".1 Questionnaires were completed 
early in April 2010 after the pre-test. In order to increase the questionnaire return rate, the bank 
facilitates the first contact by phone to the department of personnel. 2  As for the recall 
questionnaire, the sample has 405 valid questionnaires, and the valid return rate is 40.5%.  
 
4. Methodology  
 
The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method is adopted in Equation (1). However, the backward 
elimination regression will be used to measure the effect of financial institution integration on 
different type pay strategies. The backward elimination regression will eliminate the independent 
variables which has less significant effect. Finally, the remaining variables will have stronger 























       (1) 
 
Equation (1) investigates the employees’ responses in each firm. This paper will investigate the 
effects of magnitude of change of departments and the different purchase (same industry 
purchase or different industry purchase) on wage. It will measure the different effects of M&A 
within the same business purchase and different industry purchase. The dummy variable of M&A 
within the same industry ( ), it will be one if the M&A exist within the same industry, 
otherwise will be zero. The dummy variable of M&A within the different industry in the firm j 
( ), it will be one if the M&A exist within the different industry, otherwise will be zero. The 
variable of department merge in the firm j ( ), it shows that the number of department 
declination in the firm j. The variable of expanding department in the firm j ( ), it indicates 
that the number of department expansion in the firm j. More importantly, the intersection of 





jj CutSam × ) after the mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) within the same industry  can investigate the M&A effect on wages rates. The 
intersection variable of department expansion in the firm j ( jj EpdSam × ) after the mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) within the same industry generates a significant effect on wages rates. On 
the other hand, the M&A will also merge department in the firm j within the different industry. 
The intersections variable ( ) of department merge in the firm j after the mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) within the different industry can investigate the M&A effect on wages rates. 
The intersection variable ( ) of department expansion in the firm j after the mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A) within the different industry generates a significant effect on wages 
jj CutDiff ×
jj EpdDiff ×
                                                 
1 In order to obtain sufficient sample size and response rates of problems, this research issued a total of 1,000 
questionnaires. 
2 The questionnaires collect from March 26, 2010 to April 24, 2010. 
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rates.  
 
Control variables will be used to reduce the impact of other factors to estimate the resulting bias, 
this study selected the relevant variables to be controlled. The variable of Pressure ( ) 
will represent staff stress, which employees’ heavy burden watched by the personal department 
in the firm j. The variable of Education ( ) represents the average education years for 
employees in the financial firm j. Since wages strategy should depend on the industry (Balkin & 
Gomez-Mejia, 1990). The variables of Industry ( ,  and ) represent three 
financial industries, this study includes three financial industries to control the variables were 
securities institutions (securities, insurance and banking), the insurance firms (life, property and 





5. Empirical Results  
 
As seen in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2, both OLS and stepwise regressions found that the 
variable of department merge in the firm ( ) after the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
generates a significant effect on wages rates, decline approximately 14.1 and 15.1 percent 
respectively. However, as seen in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2, both OLS and stepwise 
regressions found that the variable of  department expansion in the firm ( ) after the 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) generates a significant effect on wages rates, raise 




Moreover, financial institution integration within the same industry purchase, financial 
institutions tend to adopt a higher wage policy. As seen in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2, both 
OLS and stepwise regressions found that the variable of department merge in the firm 
( ) after the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) within the same industry generates a 
significant effect on wages rates, increase approximately 11.2 and 12.8 percent respectively. At 
the same time, financial institution integration in the different industry purchase, financial 
institutions tend to adopt a higher wage policy. As seen in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2, both 
OLS and stepwise regressions found that the variable of department merge in the firm 
( ) after the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) within the different industry generates a 




With regard to expansion, financial institution integration within the different industry, financial 
institutions tends to adopt a lower wage policy. As seen in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2, both 
OLS and stepwise regressions found that the variable of  department merge in the firm 
( ) after the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) within the same industry generates a jj EpdSam ×
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significant effect on wages rates, decrease approximately 14.3 and 11.3 percent respectively. 
 
The control variables, as seen in columns (1) and (2), average years of employees’ tenure in the 
firm ( ) has the positive effect on wage, the OLS and backward elimination estimations show 
that it will increase by approximately 0.008 and 0.0095, respectively. Firms will pay higher wage 
for employees of who have higher tenure.  
jTen
 
The control variables, as seen in columns (1) and (2), average years of education of Staff in the 
firm ( ) has significant positive effects on wage, the OLS and backward elimination 
estimations show that it will increase by approximately 0.014 and 0.012, respectively. Based on 
employees’ educational years, employees of financial institutions show significantly to adopt a 





The empirical results provide the evidence from Taiwan, the department elimination will increase 
the wage of employees either in the same industry purchase or different industry purchase. It 
provides an evidence which the eliminate the size of department of firms will increase the profit 
through the reduction of labor cost, and support why workers in horizontal mergers may share in 
any increases in the production surplus, and alter the structure of the product market and increase 
the amount of surplus available for wages (Horn and Wolinsky; 1988). 
 
On the other hand, the expansion of department will lead to a negative scale effect, because the 
production cost will increase due to the higher labor cost. However, it only has significant effect 
within the same industry purchase. It implies that the horizontal mergers will have more chance 
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  Table 1: The Sample Statistics  
Variable Means Standards Deviation 
Dependent Variables:   
jWage : The log value of average monthly wage in the firm. 4.5721 (0.2120) 
Independent Variables:   
jSam : Same Industry Purchase 0.7525 (0.4321) 
jDiff : Different Industry Purchase 0.1757 (0.3811) 
jCut : The number of Department Merge in the firm. 0.6708 (0.8442) 
jEpd : The number of Department Expansion in the firm. 0.7673 (0.8456) 
jExp : Average working experience in the institution 15.401 (7.7037) 
jTen : Average tenure in the institution 6.3119 (3.1531) 
jEdu : Average education year in the institution 14.646 (2.5761) 
jessurePr : Average pressure index in the institution  0.5050 (0.5006) 
Industry Dummy variables:   
jSec : The firm in the Security industry 0.2099 (0.4077) 
jInsur : The firm in the Insurance industry 0.1852 (0.3889) 
jBank : The firm in the Banking industry 0.6049 (0.4895) 
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Table 2：Results of Wages   
 (1)OLS (2) Backward Elimination 
Constant 4.1740 (0.0930*** 4.280 (0.0570)*** 
jSam  0.0668 (0.0500) Eliminated  
jDiff  0.0230 (0.0350) Eliminated  
jCut  -0.1410 (0.0250)*** -0.1510 (0.0240)*** 
jEpd  0.1850 (0.0330)*** 0.1460 (0.0180)**** 
jj CutSam × 0.1120 (0.0300)*** 0.1280 (0.0280)*** 
jj EpdSam × -0.1430 (0.0370)*** -0.1130 (0.0220)*** 
jj CutDiff ×  0.0651 (0.0310)** 0.0421 (0.0200)** 
jj EpdDiff × -0.447
6
(0.0310) Eliminated 
jExp  0.0020. (0.0020) Eliminated 
jTen  0.0083 (0.0030)** 0.0095 (0.0030)*** 
jEdu  0.0143 (0.0040)*** 0.0122 (0.0040)*** 
jessurePr  0.0126 (0.0190) Eliminated  
jInsur  0.0912 (0.0310)*** 0.0774 (0.0260)*** 
jBank  0.2851 (0.0240) Eliminated 
R square 0.304  0.287 
Sample  405  405 
Si SiNote:(a) Based on the calculation from software of SPSS, the excluded variable is  .  jSec
(b)Standard deviation, * P < .10,** P < .05,***P < .01 
 
 
 
